Labour market policies for the unemployed combine passive income support with active measures that aim at improving jobseekers' employment prospects. This paper extends the theoretical framework developed by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) for the optimal choice between different active and passive policies. Their model is extended to a setting which allows for the use of a job search assistance programme that affects the exit rate to employment by raising search effectiveness, but not productivity in the job. These programmes are among the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries and should therefore be taken into account when considering the optimal design of labour market policies. The enriched model is used to answer a range of interesting policy questions. On the one hand, the optimality of the West German policy in the period 2000-2002 as well as the benefits from tightening monitoring are assessed. It is shown that sizeable budget savings could have been realised by switching to the optimal scheme, but that the net gains from tighter monitoring are only small. On the other hand, interesting results on the optimal use of job search assistance and training are derived. It is shown that existing policies already share some but not all features of the optimal scheme.
Introduction
In most countries, labour market policies for the unemployed rely on two sets of instruments.
On the one hand, income support during unemployment provides consumption insurance and gives jobseekers the opportunity to look for an appropriate job (so-called passive measures). On the other hand, so-called active labour market policies (ALMPs) aim at increasing jobseekers' exit rates to employment, e.g. by improving search effectiveness or skills. Expenditures on such policies are substantial, ranging from 1% to 5% of GDP in OECD countries (OECD, 2007) .
Thus, the optimal design and use of these policies is an important issue.
Traditionally, passive and active measures have been treated separately in the literature. On the one hand, starting with the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979) , there is a large literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance payments. Here, the main issue is how to provide consumption insurance while ensuring that jobseekers provide an appropriate level of search effort, which is usually unobserved by the insurer. On the other hand, there is a large numer of empirical studies that investigate what active measures worked for whom (see e.g. the surveys by Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001 ; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002) , and there is also a recent literature on the optimal allocation of heterogeneous jobseekers to different activation measures (e.g. Manski, 2000 Manski, , 2001 Manski, , 2002 Manski, , 2004 Dehejia, 2005; Frölich et al., 2003; Lechner and Smith, 2007; Hirano and Porter, 2006; Frölich, 2007 ).
Yet, there are obviously important interactions between providing search incentives through unemployment insurance, and active measures. On the one hand, ALMPs directly affect search incentives by affecting the returns to search. They aim at increasing either the job finding rate by raising search effectiveness or the number of jobs a worker qualifies for, or the returns to work like wages. On the other hand, these programmes imply additional costs, and participation reduces the time available for active job search. 1
As intermediate steps towards a joint optimisation of passive and active measures, there is some recent theoretical work on the optimal use of specific measures, such as employment subsidies (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997) , job creation subsidies and retraining (Coles and Masters, 2000) as well as layoff taxes (Blanchard and Tirole, 2006) . Moreover, Cardullo and Van der Linden (2006) and Van der Linden (2003a,b) explicitly analyse interactions between the design of the unemployment insurance system and the use of ALMPs like employment subsidies, monitoring and training. Finally, Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) and Boone et al. (2007) compare optimal unemployment insurance with and without monitoring and sanctions in a general equilibrium framework. Assuming random assignment of monitoring they show that welfare increases when monitoring is used. Pavoni and Violante (2007) are the first who develop a theoretical partial equilibrium framework where the choice between different passive and active policies during the unemployment spell is fully endogenised. 2 Similarly to Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) and Boone et al. (2007) they consider regular unemployment insurance, social assistance and monitoring. However, they allow for worker heterogeneity with respect to human capital, which is assumed to depreciate during unemployment. Moreover, in the original discussion paper version, Pavoni and Violante (2005a) also allow for training as an active policy to raise human capital, which affects both the exit rate to employment and wages. 3 The model allows Violante (2005a, 2007) to derive the optimal path of benefits during unemployment as well as the optimal sequence of policies within the unemployment spell (i.e. their timing and duration). They show that human capital dynamics are necessary for policy transitions to occur. Moreover, in the absence of training, the typical sequence of policies would be unemployment insurance with unmonitored search followed by monitored search and then social assistance, which is shown to be the optimal policy of 'last resort'. Optimal benefits turn out to be generally decreasing or constant during unemployment, but must increase after a successful spell of training in order to incentivise the worker to provide positive effort. As an illustration, they calibrate the model to the U.S. labour market and show that the optimal welfare-to-work scheme would yield sizeable welfare gains compared with the current system. One important drawback of the model by Violante (2005a, 2007) is that it does not allow for active policies that affect the job finding rate but not productivity in the job.
The most prominent example of such a policy are job search assistance programmes, which are among the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries (OECD, 2007) . They aim at increasing exit rates to employment by raising a jobseeker's search effectiveness. The programmes are usually short and hence, relatively inexpensive. Moreover, they have proven to be quite effective in many countries (e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001 ; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002) , which explains their popularity and importance.
The present paper tries to overcome this drawback by extending the theoretical framework of Pavoni and Violante (2005a) to a setting which allows for the use of a job-search-assistance technology that can raise search effectiveness, which is introduced as an additional state variable.
Hereby, the programme increases the exit rate to employment but not productivity in the job because the latter only depends on human capital. It is shown that the availability of job search assistance leads to much richer dynamics in the model because of its effect on search effectiveness.
In particular, human capital dynamics are no longer necessary for policy transition to occur.
Moreover, even in the absence of job search assistance, search effectiveness turns out to be an important determinant of the optimal policy as the optimal use of both monitoring and training depends on search effectiveness.
The theoretical results that can be derived from the enriched model confirm that the information asymmetry with respect to the worker's effort requires benefits to increase upon success of his activity and to fall upon failure in order to incentivise the worker, which underlines the generality of this result first derived by Shavell and Weiss (1979) . Furthermore, it is shown that social assistance remains an optimal policy of last resort in the enriched setting.
The enriched model is used to answer a range of interesting policy questions. For this purpose, the model is calibrated to the West German economy in the period -2002 Germany is an interesting case to study because it is comparable to most industrialised OECD countries and it is the largest among the typical continental European economies, where ALMPs are important instruments to combat unemployment. Moreover, exceptionally rich and large administrative data allow for most parameters of the model to be estimated nonparametrically for the same sample of interest, which is a large improvement compared with most existing calibrations of economic models.
A comparison of the policy actually implemented in West Germany in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] with the optimal scheme indicates a substantial inefficiency of the German system with respect to both the level and duration of benefit payments, and the use of ALMPs. However, when comparing the features of the optimal scheme with the recent reforms of the German system the optimal duration of an unemployment insurance claim and the optimal level of social assistance for a worker with median characteristics are strikingly close to what has been introduced recently in Germany.
The simulation is also used to assess whether tightening monitoring would be beneficial in West Germany. It is found that it would be optimal to use tight monitoring for almost all levels of human capital and search effectiveness, even when monitoring costs are high. However, the net gains from tightening monitoring are only small.
Another salient feature of the simulation is that varying the parameters of the job-searchassistance and training technologies allows one to obtain more general insights into their optimal use. In particular, ranges of parameter values of these policies, for which these programmes are optimally used, as well as their optimal duration and timing within the unemployment spell can be identified.
For job search assistance it turns out that an expected increase in the exit rate to employment of 0.5-3.5 %-points for a two-week programme suffices for the programme to be used in the optimal scheme, which is within the range of estimates for existing programmes (see e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Dolton and O'Neill, 2002; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Blundell et al., 2004; OECD, 2005) . In contrast, the wage effect of training must exceed 1.7% (11%) for a two-week (three-month) programme for training to be optimally used at all. Given that estimates of the total wage effect of training are usually below 10% even for much longer programmes (Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002) , it is unlikely that training will be part of the optimal scheme.
It is also found that existing ALMPs already share some but not all features of the optimal scheme. In line with existing ALMPs, it is usually optimal to use job search assistance at the beginning of unemployment and for short durations. The optimal duration of training is usually longer. Moreover, because training delays human capital depreciation, it is optimal to postpone the use of social assistance in favour of unemployment insurance payments. This justifies policies where participation prolongs benefit claims as implemented in several European countries. Yet, under the optimal policy, benefits should change depending on success or failure of a programme, which is usually not the case for existing policies. Furthermore, training should only be used for intermediate levels of human capital.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the details of the model. In Section 3 the basic mechanisms of the model are discussed and the theoretical results on the optimal benefit scheme and sequence of policies are derived. In Section 4 the model is calibrated to the West German economy in the period 2000-2002. The optimal benefit scheme and sequence of policies is derived and the optimal use of job search monitoring, job search assistance and training is discussed in detail. A sensitivity analysis complements this section. The last section concludes. An appendix contains the main proofs of the theoretical results as well as further details on the calibration. Additional proofs as well as descriptive statistics of the data are provided in a supplementary technical appendix (Wunsch, 2007b ).
2 The model
The baseline setup
The baseline economy considered by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is characterised as follows.
At the beginning of unemployment at time t = 0 a risk-neutral planner, the insurer, offers a risk-averse agent, the unemployed worker, an insurance contract which insures the worker against the random outcome of his activity -job search or participation in ALMPs -during unemployment. This contract maximises expected discounted net fiscal revenue of the insurer subject to providing the agent with at least an expected discounted utility level of U 0 . The latter is exogenously given, e.g. the outcome of voting, and can be regarded as a measure of the generosity of the welfare system. Net fiscal revenue is tax revenue if the worker is employed, and expenditures on benefit payments and ALMPs if the worker is unemployed.
Workers are infinitely lived, maximise expected discounted lifetime utility and have timeseparable preferences over consumption c ≥ 0 and effort a. Agents discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1), and period utility is given by u(c t ) − a t , where u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and smooth with lim c→∞ u (c) = 0. Moreover, the first derivative of u −1 is assumed to be convex. 4 Effort is assumed to be either high (a = e > 0) or low (a = 0), which underlines the role of fixed costs and the extensive margin of participation decisions. However, the disutility of effort during employment is generally not restricted to be the same as during unemployment, 5 but it must be ensured that accepting a job offer always dominates staying unemployed.
The planner can observe the worker's employment status (employed or unemployed), his activity (job search or participation in ALMPs during unemployment) and the outcome y (success s or failure f ) of this activity. But he cannot observe the worker's effort choice a, so that he faces a moral hazard problem. The contract specifies, for each period t and contingent on all observable histories up to t, the transfers to the worker, the policy instrument to be used and the corresponding recommended effort choice of the worker.
Workers differ in their human-capital or skill endowment h, which determines productivity in the job. In particular, a worker of type h produces output w(h) ∈ [0, w max ] during employment, with w(0) = 0 and w(·) being a continuous and increasing function. Moreover, human capital also affects the job finding probability, e.g. by affecting the number of jobs a worker qualifies for (see e.g. Mortensen, 1970) . Human capital may accumulate during employment at no cost (learning by doing) or after a successful spell of costly training according to h s = g(h)+(1−δ h )h with g (h) > 0 and g (h) ≤ 0, 6 and it depreciates at rate δ h during unemployment without training or if training fails. 7
For simplification it is assumed that workers do not have access to storage, insurance or credit markets. In particular, it is assumed that workers cannot self-insure against the random outcome y ∈ {s, f } of their search or training activity, e.g. by saving. Pavoni and Violante (2005a) show that when workers can save through credit markets but still face a no-borrowing constraint, which is a reasonable assumption for unemployed workers, the same optimal contract can be implemented by introducing a linear, time-invariant interest tax.
In the baseline model, the insurer can choose between four policies: (i) regular unemployment insurance with unmonitored job search, (ii) perfectly monitored search, where the insurer can verify the worker's search effort against payment of a fixed cost (he may, for example, pay a caseworker, who monitors closely the worker's search activities), (iii) costly training that raises human capital, and (iv) social assistance, where the worker is relieved from job search. Moreover, following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) the insurer may decide to impose a wage tax or pay a wage subsidy (also called reemployment bonus) upon reemployment of the worker.
Extensions of the baseline model
One important limitation of the model by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is that it only allows for active policies that affect both the job finding rate and wages (through an increase in human capital). Although this covers both formal training and programmes that provide work experience, it excludes job-search-assistance programmes as among the most widely used activation measures for the unemployed in OECD countries (OECD, 2007) . These programmes aim at increasing individual job finding rates by raising search effectiveness without affecting productivity in the job. The objective is to help those unemployed without any severe skill deficits to find a job as quickly as possible, e.g. by teaching them how to locate job vacancies and how to formulate a job application, or by practising job interviews. But they may also include some availability checks or other forms of weak monitoring that make jobseekers search more effectively. Usually, these programmes are short and thus, less costly than traditional training or wage subsidies. This, together with the fact that they have proven to be quite effective in many 6 In contrast to Pavoni and Violante (2005a) , no additional assumptions are made with respect to the function g (·) . Pavoni and Violante (2007) is the published version of Pavoni and Violante (2005a) , which excludes some parts of the latter discussion paper for the sake of compactness and focus. In particular, in the former the authors abstract from the accumulation of human capital and training to focus on the main dynamics of the model, which are implied by human capital depreciation.
countries (e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Dolton and O'Neill, 2002; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Blundell et al., 2004; OECD, 2005) , 8 explains the popularity and importance of job-search-assistance programmes. Therefore, these programmes should be taken into account when considering the optimal design of labour market policies.
For this reason, the economy considered by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) is enriched by introducing search effectiveness as another source of worker heterogeneity. It is assumed that the worker is endowed with an intrinsic level of search effectivenessp. This level can be raised during unemployment by use of a newly introduced costly job-search-assistance technology, but the effect of the programme may depreciate over time. Depending on whether job search assistance was successful (superscript s) or failed (superscript f ), the law of motion for p is given by
In the enriched setting, the job finding probability of an unemployed worker is not only affected by search effort a ∈ {0, e} and human capital h, but also by search effectiveness p. The corresponding hazard rate from unemployment to employment is denoted by π (h, p, a) and it is assumed that π(h, p, 0) ≡ 0 and that π(h, p, e) ≡ π(h, p) ∈ (0, 1) is continuous and increasing in both elements. Note that the monotonicity of π in h together with human capital depreciation induces negative duration dependence in π, which is an empirically well established fact in labour economics (see e.g. the survey of the relevant literature by Machin and Manning, 1999) .
The planner's problem in the enriched setting
The optimisation problem of the planner is formulated in the recursive form proposed by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) with two differences. First, job search assistance is added to the set of policies. Second, search effectiveness is introduced as another state variable, so that a state is defined by the promised continuation utility U , the level of human capital h and search effectiveness p, i.e. by the triple (U, h, p) .
At the beginning of each period, the planner chooses the optimal policy instrument i (U, h, p) for an unemployed worker, who enters the period with state (U, h, p), by solving
where V is the upper envelope of the values associated to the different policies, which are described in detail below. The planner may choose to randomise over continuation utilities U instead of deterministically providing U using a uniform random variable X t , and to specify the contract contingent on the observable realisation x t ∈ [0, 1] of this variable. This randomisation is a device to convexify the planner's problem (see also Phelan and Stacchetti, 2001; Phelan and Townsend, 1991 , as well as the technical appendix, where this property is used for some of the proofs). In this case, the planner solves
where the second equation is the promise-keeping constraint, which obliges the planner to deliver continuation utility U to the agent in expected value (with respect to x) terms.
In the following, the value functions for employment and each of the five different policy instruments are described in detail. In each case, the planner chooses an effort recommendation a(U, h, p) ∈ {0, e}, the transfer c(U, h, p) and the continuation utilities U y (U, h, p) conditional on the outcome y ∈ {f, s} of the agent's activity. There is always a promise-keeping (PK) constraint, which ensures delivery of promised utility U to the worker. Moreover, whenever positive effort is required and effort cannot be verified there is also an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint which ensures that it is optimal for the worker to choose high effort. Note that this makes the use of sanctions redundant in this framework, because the worker has no incentive to deviate from the insurer's effort recommendation.
Following Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) , employment is assumed to be absorbing without informational asymmetries in order to concentrate on the (current) unemployment experience. 9
For an employed worker and state (U, h, p) the planner solves
It is easy to show that W is continuous, increasing in h and decreasing, concave and continuously differentiable in U given the properties of w and u. Moreover, W is independent of p because 9 Qualitative results for the same unemployment spell do not change as long as the job separation rate is exogenous. Optimal contracts with endogenous job separation are studied by Zhao (2000) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2005) who show that in this case the optimal contract has to take into account the worker's full employment history.
employment is absorbing, as well as separable in U and h:
with Ω(h) = (1 − β)w(h) + βΩ(h s ) being the discounted stream of wages. Thus, consumption of the agent will be smoothed fully and promised utility will remain constant over time. The promise-keeping constraint then implies that the optimal transfer is constant over time and given Under the unemployment insurance (UI) scheme the worker is required to search with effort e and finds employment with probability π(h, p). The planner's problem is given by
where h f = (1 − δ h )h and W and V are given by (5) and (4), respectively. The first constraint is the promise-keeping (PK) constraint and the second one the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint.
If the planner chooses to monitor the search activities of the agent by using job search monitoring (JM), he is able to verify the worker's search effort against payment of a cost κ JM and solves the problem
Note that the planner will never combine monitoring with low effort because any deviation from no search can be observed at no additional cost since π(h, p, 0) = 0. Also note the absence of the IC constraint because here, the planner can verify search effort so that there is no incentive problem during JM. This also implies that monitoring is assumed to be perfect. Although monitoring might only be imperfect in reality, this serves as an interesting benchmark case for the optimal design of labour market policies. 10
If the agent is enrolled in a programme i, which is either training (TR) or job search assistance (JA), the planner solves
The programmes are costly, requiring payment of a fixed cost κ i . They are successful with probability θ i (a), which depends positively on effort a ∈ {e, 0}. 11 It is assumed that θ i ≡ θ i (e) > 0 and that θ i (0) = 0.
Because of the latter, the programmes will always be combined with high effort, since the cost of the programme would not be compensated by a return if effort is zero. It is also assumed that search and programme participation are mutually exclusive activities within a period, implying that participants in i cannot exit to employment directly from the programme. 12 But since the length of a period can be arbitrarily small, this assumption is not restrictive. Since positive effort is required (a = e > 0), both the PK and the IC constraint are needed. 13
Under the social assistance (SA) scheme the worker is not required to search (a = 0) but receives some transfer that ensures delivery of promised utility U . Since effort is zero, no IC constraint is needed. The planner's problem is, therefore, given by
Proposition 0 in the appendix states the properties of the value functions V, W and V i .
In particular, they are continuous functions, which are increasing in h and p and decreasing, concave and continuously differentiable in U .
3 Theoretical results
Optimal sequence of payments under each policy
Proposition 1 confirms that the presence of the information asymmetry with respect to the worker's effort requires benefits to increase upon success of his activity and to fall upon failure in order to incentivise the worker, which underlines the generality of this result first derived by Shavell and Weiss (1979 The proof in Appendix A shows that results (i) and (ii) are independent of the presence of human capital and search effectiveness as state variables in the model, because they are driven by the presence or relevance of the IC constraint only. Thus, they are completely general.
Intuitively, under JM and SA there is no incentive problem because under JM search effort can be verified, and SA releases the worker from any search activity. The same holds if the IC constraint is not binding during UI, JA and TR. Thus, full insurance with constant benefit payments is provided. In contrast, the necessity to incentivise agents to provide positive effort during UI, JA and TR when the IC constraint binds, requires the planner to 'punish' the agent upon failure and to 'reward' him upon success of his activity. 14 Result (iii) follows from wages w(h) decreasing during unemployment because of human capital depreciation and promised utility U remaining constant during JM, which implies that the wage
UI is a quantitative issue because both w(h) and U decline, so that the total effect on τ (U, h) depends on the relative speed of the decline.
Optimal sequence of policies
In the following, both the economic forces at work and the theoretical results on the optimal sequence of policies, that can be derived from the model, are discussed.
Before turning to the more general case with human capital dynamics, it is interesting to see what can be derived in the absence of human capital dynamics. 15 Violante (2005a, 2007) show that in the baseline model in this case all policies are absorbing, i.e. that human capital dynamics are necessary for policy transitions to occur. The reason is that conditional on positive effort being required, human capital is the only factor that can affect the returns to search. If h does not change during the unemployment spell, no policy change is required.
Proposition 2 shows that this result generally does not hold in the enriched setting, because job search assistance can affect the returns to search even in the absence of human capital dynamics.
This implies that the presence of job search assistance and search effectiveness in the model leads to much richer dynamics than the baseline model. Proposition 2, which is proven in Appendix A, implies that if JA is not used in period 0, i.e.
at (U 0 , h,p), it will never be used if θ JA ≤ π(h,p). Because of the latter condition this is more likely the larger h and the intrinsic level of search effectiveness,p, and the lower the success rate of JA, θ JA . Moreover, in this case the other policies are absorbing. On the other hand, if JM is optimal in period 0, i.e. at (U 0 , h,p), then it is used forever even if θ JA > π (h,p) . However, in all other cases JM and UI are not absorbing because whenever JA is used and search effectiveness changes, either because it accumulates during JA or because it depreciates after use of JA, the returns to search and the incentive costs during UI change.
Now consider the case with human capital dynamics. Whenever positive effort e is required, as is the case for all policies except SA, the planner must compensate the agent for this effort (so-called effort compensation cost). Since the disutility of providing e is fixed while, because of the concavity of u(·), the marginal utility of consumption falls with increasing U , the effort compensation in terms of (utility from) transfer payments must increase with U . Thus, the effort compensation cost will be prohibitively large for high levels of U , making SA most attractive.
Since promised utility U does not fall during SA (see below), SA should remain optimal.
Another case where SA is most attractive is when the depreciation of human capital and (potentially) search effectiveness has reduced the returns to search to a prohibitively low level.
Since human capital depreciates further while search effectiveness does not increase during SA, any policy other than SA becomes even less attractive after one period of SA implying that SA should remain optimal in this case as well. Indeed, Proposition 3 (i) shows that SA is always absorbing. 
(iv) If g(h) is strictly concave, TR is not absorbing.
As result a of Proposition 3 (i) and because π(h, p, 0) = 0, the equilibrium value of SA does not depend on h and p and is given byV
, where the benefit paid during SA is constant and given by c SA (
Another important cost component are the incentive costs, which arise from having to obey an IC constraint during JA, UI and TR. Using the PK constraints, the IC constraints in these three cases can be rewritten as
which is independent of the transfer c. Since larger differences in the utility upon success and failure of the worker's activity correspond to larger differences in the respective consumption levels, the risk-averse agent has to be compensated with a larger average transfer for a given level of promised utility U . If the IC constraint is binding, (11) implies that incentive costs remain constant for JA and TR but increase for UI when h and potentially p fall during unemployment because π(·) declines in this case.
For i ∈ {JM, JA, T R} the are also direct cost κ i which have to be incurred. In case of JA and TR, this adds to the incentive cost, while for JM it replaces the incentive cost that has to be incurred during UI. The latter implies that UI should only be used before JM as long as the incentive cost is lower than the fixed cost κ JM . Moreover, since the incentive cost increases during UI, a switch to JM becomes more likely with increasing unemployment duration. Once κ JM is lower than the incentive cost during UI, a switch back to UI should only occur after successful use of JA or TR because, otherwise, the incentive cost keeps rising for UI because of the depreciation of h and potentially p. Result (ii) of Proposition 3 shows that this is indeed the case under very general conditions. 16
Whether and if so when in the unemployment spell JA and TR will be used, depends on the returns of these programmes relative to their costs. The former are bounded above because both the job finding rate and wages are bounded above, making the use of these policies less likely the higher h and p. Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that JA (TR) will not be absorbing if the increase in p (h) upon success of JA (TR) declines with p (h) while the cost of the programme,
, remains constant, since in this case, the programme will become unprofitable at some point after its successful use. Note, moreover, that during both programmes effort compensation, incentive and direct costs have to be incurred. Thus, at least for one period these costs have to be offset by the (expected) returns in order for the programmes to be used at all.
Simulation for West Germany
In order to derive more detailed insights into the optimal sequence of policies, the model is comparing it with the optimal scheme that results when the same initial utility U 0 (h 0 , p 0 ) is delivered to a worker with characteristics (h 0 , p 0 ) as implied by the actual system. Second, the potential benefits of tightening monitoring in West Germany are evaluated. Third, to draw some general conclusions on the optimal use of job-search-assistance and training technologies, ranges of parameter values of these policies, for which these programmes are optimally used, as well as their optimal duration and timing within the unemployment spell are identified.
Unemployment insurance in West Germany
In Germany, unemployment insurance is mandatory and employees, who have contributed for at least 12 months within the 3 years before entering unemployment, are eligible for unemployment benefits (UB) if they register with the public employment service (PES). The minimum UB entitlement is 6 months. In the period under consideration, the maximum claim increased stepwise with total contribution time in the 7 years before becoming unemployed, and age, up to a maximum of 32 months at age 54 or above with previous contributions of at least 64 months. Since 1994, the replacement rate is 67% of previous average net earnings from insured employment with dependent children, and 60% without.
Until 2005, unemployed could become eligible for unemployment assistance (UA) after exhaustion of UB. In contrast to UB, UA was means tested and potentially indefinite. However, like UB, UA was proportional to previous earnings but with lower replacement rates than UB (57% and 53% with and without dependent children, respectively). Unemployed who were ineligible for UB and UA could receive social assistance, which was a fixed monthly payment unrelated to previous earnings, means-tested and administered by local authorities. Actual payment of benefits is conditional on active job search, regular show-up at the PES and participation in labour market programmes. In case of noncompliance with benefit conditions, sanctions, i.e. reductions in or suspensions of benefits, can be imposed. However, search activities are monitored not very strictly due to capacity constraints within the PES. Expenditures on training are substantial given the number of participants for two reasons.
First, with durations of up to two years, training programmes are relatively long in Germany compared with most OECD countries. Second, participants usually receive a special form of benefit (so-called maintenance allowance) while in the programme, which is of the same amount as UB or UA. Until 2005 these benefits did not affect remaining UB claims and hence, increased total benefit claims, thus providing strong incentives to participate in training.
In terms of the number of participants, job search assistance has become the most important activation measure, by far, in recent years. Expenditures are moderate because durations are short (up to three months but usually no more than one month). Support of self-employment also has gained importance in recent years, while the use of subsidised employment is declining, both in the number of entries and in durations and expenditures. 18
Data and population of interest
With the exception of the preference and programme cost parameters, all parameters of the model are calibrated using an administrative database, which has been built up by the German The database comprises very detailed information in several dimensions. Personal characteristics include education, age, gender, marital status, number of children, profession, nationality and health. The benefit payment register provides information on type and amount of benefits received, remaining benefit claims and imposition of sanctions. The jobseeker register includes information on the desired form of employment, compliance with benefit conditions and the number of placement propositions by the PES. Moreover, the data comprise information on employments including form of employment, industry, occupational status and wages. With respect to programme participation, the data cover type of the programme as well as planned and actual duration. Detailed regional information, which include federal state, local unemployment rate, migration, demographic and industry structure, infrastructure and urbanity, complement the database (see the technical appendix for a full list of variables).
For the simulation, the model is calibrated to the population of West German workers who registered unemployed with the PES between January 2000 and December 2002 and received benefits from the unemployment insurance system (UB or UA). 19 To concentrate on the main body of the workforce, apprentices, young men on civilian or military service as well as elderly workers in special forms of employment are excluded. This reduced sample is referred to as the reference population of interest in the following.
Calibration
In the simulation, time units are defined by half-months. This is the smallest level of aggregation which is reasonable with the data. Human capital is measured in terms of wages and calibrated using the wage from the last employment spell before entering unemployment. 20 The definition of search effectiveness is more complicated since it is not observed in the data. Here, it is estimated by the contribution of variables related to search effectiveness to the probability of finding employment within 3 months after entering unemployment. Concretely, search effectiveness of individual j is estimated aŝ
where Y = 1 if the worker succeeded in finding employment within 3 months after entering unemployment, and where Z is a vector of variables that are related to search effectiveness, while X contains all other variables that affect the job finding probability. A probit model is estimated with Z including -inter alia -measurements of labour market attachment, duration of past unemployment spells, compliance with benefit conditions, number of placement propositions by the PES in the past, local labour market conditions, health, foreigner status and presence of (young) children. See Appendix B for more details. 21
Preferences are parametrised as follows. The half-monthly discount factor β is chosen to match an interest rate of 4% per annum, which prevailed in the EURO area in the period of 19 This excludes recipients of social assistance (SA). Because SA is administered by local authorities, there is no common register for recipients of SA. For this reason, individual data on these persons are unavailable in Germany. 20 Most individuals enter directly from employment (71%). For all other persons, the wage is depreciated according to the calibrated wage depreciation rate for the time between leaving employment and entering unemployment. Moreover, for part-time-workers the wage is scaled up to obtain an approximate fulltime equivalent. Figure 8 in Appendix E displays the corresponding wages. See Appendix B for more details. 21 In the numerical solution h and p are discretised, while U is treated as continuous variables. For h and p the grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with 20 grid points chosen for h and 10 for p. The grid chosen for U has 500 equidistant points in the interval [50, 1500] . For each combination of h and p, the value functions for all policies with respect to U are computed using Chebychev polynomials up to the 20th order.
interest. Period utility over consumption is assumed to be logarithmic, i.e. u(c) ≡ ln(c), but specifications with intertemporal elasticities of substitution below and above one are tested as well. To calibrate the disutility of effort, e, an approach that originates from common practice in calibrating macroeconomic models, is used. Let the disutility of time n spent working be logarithmic as well, and denote by φ the relative weight on leisure versus consumption. Assuming a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, the static optimality condition of the worker yields a value of φ = 2.35 given a labour share of 0.73 (BMAS, 2003) , a consumption-income ratio of 0.72 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000 -2002 and a fraction of time spent working of n = 0.3. This implies a value for the disutility of work effort of e = φ[ln(1) − ln(1 − n)] = 0.84 (Chari et al., 1995) . For the baseline calibration it is assumed that the disutility of effort during unemployment equals the one during work. Yet, as a sensitivity check, the case where only half of the time spent on work is spent on search and programme participation is considered as well.
Nonparametric estimates of the baseline exit rates to employment as well as the wage depreciation and accumulation rates without participation in JA or TR can be obtained from nonparticipants, who are matched to the reference population of interest using the radius matching estimator proposed and applied by . The matching is performed because interest is in the values of these parameters for the reference population, which also includes participants and therefore, differs systematically from actual nonparticipants in characteristics that also affect the exit rate to employment as can be seen from In order to calibrate the job-search-assistance and training technologies, estimates of the effects of JA and TR of different durations on, respectively, p and h for the reference population of interest are required. The reason is that each period, the planner has to decide whether the worker should be assigned to a programme or, if he already attends a programme, whether he should stay for another period. However, when trying to estimate these effects, two kinds of selection problems arise. First, as can be seen from Table 1 in the technical appendix, the 22 In the simulation, depreciation and accumulation of h and p are stochastic. The respective depreciation and accumulation probabilities are calculated from the respective depreciation and accumulation rates as well as the geometric rate at which the grids for h and p are spaced.
respective programme participants differ systematically from the population of interest in ways that are also related to the respective outcome variables of interest. Second, actual programme durations are potentially endogenous. In the reference population of interest, actual durations differ from planned durations by more than 15% in 11% and 21% of the cases for JA and TR, respectively. Thus, actual programme durations cannot be regarded as exogenous.
Given sufficiently rich data, both selection problems can be solved using a so-called dynamic (or sequential) treatment evaluation approach as suggested by Miquel (2001, 2005) .
The idea is to consider a τ -period programme as a sequence of τ one-period programmes and to control for selection at the beginning of each of the τ periods. Selectivity between programme participants and the population of interest can then be controlled for at the beginning of the sequence (at t = 0), whereas endogeneity of programme durations is accounted for by selection It turns out that none of the programmes succeeds in raising search effectiveness or human capital independent of programme duration (see Appendix D). 24 Since programme participation is costly, it is, therefore, obvious that JA and TR should not be used in the optimal policy.
However, the simulation allows to identify regions of parameter values, for which it is optimal to use these programmes, thus providing reference values, e.g. for the minimum effectiveness such programmes must exhibit in order to be optimally used at all. Concretely, different values of the success rates of JA and TR, θ JA and θ T R , that match specific accumulation rates of, respectively, p and h are simulated. Moreover, since the depreciation rate of search effectiveness cannot be calibrated from the data because the effects of JA are zero, different values of δ p will be tested in the simulation.
Values for the cost parameters of JA and TR are calculated from total expenditures on the respective programme per year (excluding benefit payments), the number of participants and average programme durations from official statistics (BA, 2001 (BA, -2005 . This yields programme costs of κ JA = 190 and κ T R = 300 per half-month in EUR. To parameterise the cost of tight monitoring, the average gross salary of a caseworker per half-month (about 1200 EUR according to BA, 2001 BA, -2005 is divided by the number of unemployed a caseworker can reasonably take care of in a half-month. A conservative number would be 20, which yields a value of 60 EUR.
Allowing for some administrative cost, the baseline value for κ JM is set to 100 EUR. The cost parameters will be varied to check the sensitivity of the simulation results to these values.
The parameters of the policy implemented in West Germany in the period under consideration,
i.e. amount and duration of benefits as well as programme durations and fraction of unemployed subject to each policy in the period 2000-2002, are calculated directly from the data. Figure 8 in Appendix E displays the values of these parameters as a function of human capital.
Results
4.4.1 Optimal policy and benefit scheme for West Germany The duration for which UI is optimally used is completely determined by human capital because human capital depreciation is the dominant factor in this case. At the lowest level of h, the returns to search are too low relative to promised utility, so that it is not worthwhile to provide search incentives at all. However, the higher the initial level of h the higher the returns to search and the lower the incentive costs during UI, so the longer it is optimal to incentivise 25 In the period under consideration, search activities were monitored not very strictly due to capacity constraints within the PES. Therefore, JM, which is assumed to be perfect in the model, is disregarded for the moment.
the worker. Note that not providing search incentives for the lowest-skilled is a feature of many existing policies since often, the level of benefits for this group of people, which is determined by promised utility U 0 , is so high that their reservation wages lie above their expected wages. There are several ways how the result of different optimal durations of UI, i.e. UI claims, for jobseekers with different levels of human capital could be interpreted. Clearly, in contrast to the amount of benefits, it is probably very difficult to implement a policy that discriminates claim durations according to previous wages. Under the assumption that wages increase with tenure and age, one way to (at least partly) implement such a scheme would be to differentiate claims by previous time of contribution to the unemployment insurance and age. This is already common practice in many countries, including Germany.
Another way of looking at this result would be to use it to choose the optimal policy scheme for different populations of unemployed according to their median or mean characteristics. That means that countries where unemployment is a problem mainly of the very low-skilled can choose shorter durations of UI, while countries where higher-skilled people are affected as well should allow for longer UI claims. This would imply that the difference, e.g. between the short UI claims in the U.S. or Australia and the longer claims in Germany, is actually in line with the characteristics of the optimal scheme.
For West Germany, the optimal duration of UI at median human capital would be 13 months.
Interestingly, this is very close to the maximum unemployment benefit claim of 12 months that has been introduced with the last large reform of unemployment insurance in Germany for the majority of unemployed (aged below 55). The wage tax imposed on employed workers decreases during UI because wages decline faster than benefits. For low values of human capital, it is optimal to pay a wage subsidy (or reemployment bonus) from the beginning of the unemployment spell to keep the value of working sufficiently high to make search attractive. Note that this would be in line with the proposal currently discussed in Germany to introduce so-called combined wages (supplementary benefits for workers with low-paid jobs). For high values of human capital, the wage tax turns into a subsidy only after some time, when the value of working has deteriorated due to human capital depreciation. These findings confirm the well-known result by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) that it is optimal to use wage taxes and reemployment bonuses, but also refines the conditions for their optimal use. Note: The skill levels correspond to the 5th, 10th and 15th 5%-quantile of the human capital distribution. The replacement rate is the last (gross) wage before entering unemployment divided by the benefit. The wage tax is (gross) wage minus consumption upon reemployment in % of the (gross) wage.
Panel ( that optimal benefits are considerably larger at the beginning of the unemployment spell. For medium levels of human capital, they decline to a level which is about the same as actual unemployment assistance (UA), while for the low-skilled they are somewhat higher. However, for high-skilled workers the optimal long-run replacement rate is considerably lower.
The fact that optimal long-run benefits are often smaller than actual benefits leads to a potential for considerable government budget savings by switching from the actual to the optimal policy. When providing the same initial utility to agents as under the actual policy, 14% of actual expenditures on benefits or about 11 billion EUR could have been saved in West Germany in the period 2000-2002. 26 Moreover, the waste of the costs on JA and TR implies savings of almost 6 billion EUR for this period. Although these values might not be taken at face value given the necessary simplifications of the model, they clearly indicate a substantial inefficiency of the German system. Figure 3 shows that if monitoring would be tightened to resemble perfect JM, it would be used in the optimal scheme. The total duration for which it is optimal to incentivise agents remains constant, because it is determined by human capital depreciation, which is unaffected by JM.
Optimal use of job search monitoring
However, the relative use of JM and UI depends on the relation of the incentive costs during UI to the monitoring cost. The larger human capital and search effectiveness, the higher the exit rate to employment, so that it is less costly to provide search incentives relative to incurring the fixed monitoring cost κ JM = 100 EUR. Therefore, UI is used for longer periods while JM is used for shorter periods the higher h and p. Note that this implies that, in the absence of p in the model, it is not possible to fully determine the optimal timing and duration of JM, which provides an important role for p in the model even in the absence of job search assistance.
In case JM is used, benefits remain constant as predicted by the model. However, they are usually smaller than during UI because of the absence of the incentive costs. Instead, the monitoring cost has to be incurred. Overall, the budget savings from using JM as well are negligible. What happens is that about the same amount of money is spent in a different way.
26 The fact that actual recipients of SA had to be excluded from the analysis because of data unavailability might have some implications for the true potential for benefit savings. These people are usually low-skilled and likely to have low search effectiveness. Since the utility actually provided to these people is somewhat lower than for the other unemployed, it is likely that the optimal level of SA is comparable with the actual one. However, it is also likely that it would be optimal to incentivise at least part of the actual recipients of SA, which would imply somewhat higher expenditure in the beginning of the unemployment spell. This would imply that overall budget savings are likely to be somewhat smaller. Note: Monitoring cost per half-month κ JM = 100 EUR. The human capital grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with the lowest grid absorbing all wages below the second lowest grid. Grid points of 14 and above all lie in the top 5%-quantile of the human capital distribution. p = 1, 5 refers to the first and fifths 20%-quantile of the distribution of search effectiveness.
It remains to be assessed how the use of the monitoring technology depends on the monitoring cost. In Figure 4 , κ JM is varied from 100-1000 EUR per half-month and the results are displayed for a worker with median skills and two levels of search effectiveness. Naturally, the use of JM is reduced with increasing cost. Yet, even at rather extreme values of κ JM , JM is still used. What changes is that JM is used later in the unemployment spell after increasing use of UI, because the cost of providing search incentives decreases relative to the monitoring cost. As a result of increased use of UI, benefits decline to lower levels the larger κ JM , which compensates for the higher fixed cost of monitoring. Note: Human capital is set to its median grid. Simulation for 3 years. p = 1, 5 refers to the first and fifths 20%-quantile of the distribution of search effectiveness.
To conclude, it would be optimal to use tight (perfect) monitoring for almost all levels of human capital and search effectiveness and even when monitoring costs are high. However, since the (additional) budget savings from using JM are negligible and the job finding rates are unchanged, there is no benefit from introducing it in West Germany. 27 This conclusion is strengthened by the argument that monitoring can probably be only imperfect in reality and that its implementation would require hiring (and training) a large number of caseworkers, which would imply additional costs.
Optimal use of job search assistance
The model allows to identify conditions under which JA and TR are used in the optimal policy scheme. For this purpose, the effects of the programmes are simulated as the probability that JA and TR respectively increase search effectiveness and human capital by 10% within a halfmonth. 28 Note that these probabilities can be interpreted as the success rates of the programmes, θ JA and θ T R , when h and p change in 10%-steps (as is the case in the simulation).
In the first step, the choice between UI, JM, JA and SA is simulated. The success rate of JA for a 10% increase in p is varied between 10-100%, which corresponds to an accumulation rate of p, denoted by α p , of 1-10% per half-month. Note that even if α p = 10% the impact on the exit rate to employment would range only between 2-10 %-points per half-month, and in the long run, it would not exceed an overall gain of 20 %-points. Thus, the range of accumulation rates considered is reasonable. Table 2 summarises the optimal first-time use of JA as a function of search effectiveness p, human capital h and the accumulation rate α p of p. It turns out that the accumulation rate of p must exceed 3% per half-month for JA to be optimally used at all. This corresponds to an expected increase in the exit rate to employment of 0.5-3.5 %-points for a two-week programme, which is within the range of estimates for existing programmes (see e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Dolton and O'Neill, 2002; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Blundell et al., 2004; OECD, 2005) . Interestingly, this result remains to hold even if the cost of JA is low (or even zero) because the incentive costs are the main determinant here. Once they are too high relative to the (expected) returns to JA because θ JA is low, JA will not be used independent of its direct cost.
The required minimum effectiveness of JA increases with initial search effectiveness and human capital because the incentive costs during UI decrease in both elements while those of JA are 27 This conclusion might change when the monitoring technology is such that it affects the exit rate to employment, e.g. by raising either search effort or search effectiveness. This issue is analysed in Wunsch (2007a) . 28 A 10% increase in h or p corresponds to an increase in the respective variable by one grid point in the simulation.
constant given θ JA , so that UI (or JM if this is even less costly than UI) becomes relatively more attractive. Moreover, the expected total returns of JA are bounded above. 
h refers to the 20 human capital grids used in the simulation. p refers to the 5 quintiles of the distribution of search effectiveness.
The table also shows that, as expected, JA is never used for agents with the highest level of search effectiveness (p = 5) because the returns to JA would be zero. It is also never used for the lowest-skilled or once h has depreciated to its lowest level (h = 1) because expected wages are too low to make search attractive in this case, even if the job finding rate could be increased considerably by use of JA. 29 Moreover, if human capital is high the incentive costs during UI are low and the returns to search (in particular wages) are high compared with those of JA even if α p is high, so that UI dominates JA. Note that this implies that higher-skilled workers should be assigned to JA only later in the unemployment spell after human capital has depreciated.
However, in all other cases it is optimal to use JA directly at the beginning of unemployment. This is actually how many existing ALMPs use JA.
Also in line with existing ALMPs is the finding that the optimal duration of JA is usually short. If the accumulation rate of p or the success rate of JA is either high or low, the optimal duration of JA is 0.5-2 months, while for intermediate cases it can be somewhat longer, ranging from 1-5 months. If the returns to JA are high, their upper bound is reached quickly. In contrast, for low success rates of JA the incentive costs during UI drop relatively easily below those of JA and the expected returns decline once search effectiveness increases after successful use of JA.
After use of JA, that policy is used which would be optimal in that period in the absence of JA given characteristics (h, p). Since p increases after successful use of JA, this means that the use of UI is effectively prolonged and that of JM is shorted. However, the overall duration for which it is optimal to incentivise agents is unchanged because it is determined by human capital depreciation, which is unaffected by JA.
Once p has depreciated after successful use of JA, it is always optimal to return to JA as long as h > 1. The reason is that the returns to JA do not fall, the direct and incentive costs are unchanged, and the increase in the effort compensation cost after successful use of JA is only small and in most cases compensated by a fall during the policy that followed JA. Naturally, the larger the depreciation rate of p, the earlier the worker should be re-assigned to JA.
Note that for the case where the accumulation rate of p changes with p or h, or where it varies across different types of JA, the same arguments apply as above because the optimal use of JA is determined by a specific combination of (U, h, p) and the accumulation rate of p or the success rate of JA. It makes no difference for the results whether the variation in α p or θ JA happens across individuals, across different programme types, within the unemployment spell or across otherwise equal economies.
With respect to optimal benefits, the predictions of the model apply. They should fall -as under UI -when JA fails and they should increase if it succeeds. In the simulation, the increases in benefits are small. They could be implemented as premia that are paid to jobseekers during or after participation in JA. Now, what are the implications of the availability of an effective job-search-assistance technology for the government budget? If α p > 3% so that JA is part of the optimal policy, budget savings of 3-8% could be realised compared with the optimal policy without JA. Naturally, if it would be possible to provide JA at a lower fixed cost, budget savings could even be higher.
Optimal use of training
In contrast to JA, TR not only affects the exit rate to employment but also wages, which are the main determinant of the value of employment. The latter is very important, because even if the exit rate is high, search incentives are low if the value of employment is low. Moreover, the effect of h on the job finding rate is relatively small, especially for larger values of h. Since in the simulation increases in h directly translate into equivalent changes in wages, the range of reasonable values for the returns to TR are different from those for JA. According to Heckman et al. (1999) , Martin and Grubb (2001) and Kluve and Schmidt (2002) , the total return to training in terms of wage increases usually does not exceed 10% for programmes of durations of usually 1-6 months,or in some countries like Germany even of 12 months or more. Thus, accumulation rates of more than 3-4% per half-month seem very unlikely. Therefore, only values of 0.1-4% per half-month are simulated.
As h accumulates and depreciation of h is delayed during TR, the point from which SA is optimal is delayed as well, thus increasing the period for which it is optimal to incentivise agents.
Note that this justifies policies where participation prolongs benefit claims as implemented, for example, in several Scandinavian countries and Germany. Yet, under the optimal policy, benefits should change depending on success or failure of TR, which is usually not the case for existing policies. Figure 5 summarises the optimal first-time use of TR in the absence of JA at different accumulation rates of human capital for the human capital grids used in the simulation. The grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with the lowest grid absorbing all levels of h below the second lowest grid. Because of the latter, the results for the lowest grid are not displayed, because an increase by one grid point corresponds to an increase in h by much more than 10%, so that the return to TR would be much higher than for the other grids and the results would not be comparable. Note again that it does not matter for the validity of the results whether the variation in the returns to TR happens across individuals, across different programme types, within the unemployment spell or across otherwise equal economies.
It turns out that a wage accumulation rate of at least α h = 1.8% is necessary for TR to be used at all, which means that the effect of TR must be relatively large (11% for a 3-month programme or 24% for a 6-month programme). Below that, the returns to TR are just too low given that the incentive costs during TR are very high in this case (in particular, much higher than during UI). This is also the reason why this result is independent of the direct cost of training. 30 Thus, given the range of estimates for existing programmes mentioned above, using TR will rarely be optimal.
As α h increases, the incentive costs during TR decrease, while the returns to TR increase.
Yet initially, TR will only be used for intermediate values of h. At high levels of h the incentive cost is much smaller during UI than during TR and zero during JM, so that these policies are preferred if the returns to TR are not sufficiently high. Moreover, the returns to TR are bounded above. Clearly, the highest-skilled will never be trained because the returns to TR are zero. Note that this implies that for workers who enter unemployment with high human capital, TR should not be used until later in the unemployment spell after UI, when h has depreciated.
In contrast, at low levels of h the fixed cost of TR is prohibitively high given the returns to TR relative to what would have to be paid in terms of the benefit and potential incentive and effort compensation cost during UI, JM and SA. Note: The human capital grids are geometrically spaced at rate 10% with the lowest grid absorbing all levels of h below the second lowest grid. p = 1, 5 refers to the first and fifths 20%-quantile of the distribution of search effectiveness.
Upon failure of TR, it is optimal to stay in the programme as long as h does not depreciate to a level at which it is no longer optimal to use TR. If TR is successful, agents should stay as long as h does not become too high. This implies that if h is either low or high, TR should be relatively short (0.5-4 months), while at intermediate values it can be rather long (more than 12 months possible), because of its strong impact on the value of employment, which makes TR a dominant policy.
What happens if, in addition to training, there is an effective job-search-assistance technology available as well? For TR, α h is set to 2% while α p is varied between 4-10% per half-month.
In this case, the accumulation rate of p must exceed 6% for JA to be used at all, because the effect of TR on the value of employment dominates the impact of JA on the job finding rate.
Of course, the larger α h , the more TR dominates JA and the less JA is used. In particular, JA will no longer be used if α h > 3.2%, but note that this would require a very large effect of TR.
Like before and similar to TR, JA is neither used for the highest-skilled (h ≥ 17) because UI is less costly in this case, nor for the lowest-skilled, for which providing incentives is too costly.
As α p increases, JA is first used at the lower end of the range h = 2, ..., 16, then at the upper end, and for all values of this range when α p = 10%. In the two latter cases, JA is used at the beginning of the unemployment spell for 2-3 half-months, then followed by TR. This is what we observe in many existing ALMPs. At the lower end of h, when α p < 10%, optimal durations are usually longer, ranging from 2-4 months. As p depreciates after successful use of JA, it is optimal to re-assign the worker to JA. In case of re-assignment, the optimal duration of JA is usually 1-2 half-months.
Unfortunately, the budget implications of TR cannot be assessed. Clearly, expenditures during unemployment are much higher because benefits increase with h and relatively high direct programme cost have to be incurred. However, since the model is simulated for the case where workers remain unemployed, the returns in terms of tax revenue and saved expenditures during unemployment once a jobseeker has found employment are not fully considered, while the worst case maximum expenditures during unemployment are calculated. 31
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity of the results with respect to key parameters of the model is tested. However, it has to be pointed out that the scope of the sensitivity analysis is limited by the numerical load of the simulation (approximation of the value functions), in particular when key parameters of the model are changed.
To simulate the case where there is uncertainty about the exit rate to employment or where it changes once the optimal policy is implemented, the exit rate is perturbated by 10% in both directions. It is found that a variation of the exit rate within this range does not change the results.
The sensitivity of the results with respect to the choice of the utility function of the worker is checked as well. Rather than log utility, u(c) = c 1−σ 1−σ is chosen with intertemporal elasticity of substitution once above and once below one (σ ∈ {0.8, 1.2}). 32 Note that if σ is below (above) one, initial utility provided by the actual policy is higher (lower) than in the baseline case, because the same level of consumption implies higher (lower) utility. Moreover, because of (11), benefits must decline more slowly (faster) upon failure of the activity, when the incentive constraint binds under UI, JA or TR. However, it is found that the optimal sequence of policies remains unchanged. Because of the changed evolution of benefits, the main changes are with respect to the implications for the government budget. For the baseline case without JM, JA and TR, the budget savings are reduced (increased) by 5 (3) %-points.
Finally, the disutility of effort, e, is allowed to vary between work and search. The simulation is repeated for the case where only half of the time spent working is spent on search or programme participation during unemployment. This implies a stronger preference for leisure during unemployment and hence, a higher disutility of effort of 0.93 rather than 0.84 in the base- 31 In each period where UI or JM are used, the returns are taken into account with weight one minus the job finding rate. Under JA, only the job finding rate is affected, so the full return is taken into account. However, TR also affects the value of employment and that is only taken into account with a weight considerably smaller than one. 32 The utility functions are normalised to match u(1) = 0 as under log utility. line case. Higher e implies higher incentive costs during UI, JA and TR, but also makes work relatively more attractive. In the simulation, these effects seem to offset each other, because all results remain unchanged.
Conclusion
This paper extends the theoretical framework developed by Pavoni and Violante (2005a) for the optimal choice between different active and passive measures for the unemployed to a setting which allows for policies that affect the exit rate to employment but not productivity in the job. The most prominent example of such a policy are job search assistance programmes, which aim at increasing search effectiveness and are one of the most widely used activation measures in OECD countries (OECD, 2007) . The advantages of these programmes are that they are relatively short and hence, inexpensive and that they have proven to be quite effective in many countries (e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002) . Therefore, it is important to take these programmes into account when considering the optimal design of labour market policies.
In the enriched model, workers differ not only with respect to human capital, which depreciates during unemployment, but also with respect to search effectiveness. The insurer can choose between unemployment benefits, social assistance, job search monitoring, job search assistance and training, and he can impose wage taxes or pay reemployment bonuses as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) . Thereby, the model allows optimising over the most important instruments of active and passive labour market policies in all critical respects, namely their allocation among heterogeneous workers, the amount of benefits, and the duration and timing within the unemployment spell. Thus, it can be used to answer a wide range of interesting policy questions.
The results show that the availability of job search assistance as additional policy instrument leads to much richer dynamics in the model because of its effect on search effectiveness.
Moreover, even in the absence of job search assistance, search effectiveness as newly introduced state variable turns out to be an important determinant of the optimal policy as the optimal use of both monitoring and training depends on search effectiveness.
A comparison of the policy actually implemented in West Germany in the period [2000] [2001] [2002] with the optimal scheme indicates a substantial inefficiency of the German system with respect to both the level and duration of benefit payments, and the use of ALMPs. However, when comparing the features of the optimal scheme with the recent reforms of the German system the optimal duration of an unemployment insurance claim and the optimal level of social assistance for a worker with median characteristics are strikingly close to what has been introduced recently in Germany. Moreover, related to the current discussion about the introduction of so-called combined wages (supplementary benefits for workers with low-paid jobs) in Germany, it is shown that for low levels of human capital reemployment bonuses should be used, which confirms the well-known result by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) that it is optimal to use such bonuses, but also refines the conditions for their optimal use.
The simulation is also used to assess whether tightening monitoring would be beneficial in West Germany. It is found that it would be optimal to use tight monitoring for almost all levels of human capital and search effectiveness, even when monitoring costs are high. However, the net gains from tighter monitoring are too small to justify its implementation.
For job search assistance it is found that an expected increase in the exit rate to employment of 0.5-3.5 %-points for a two-week programme suffices for the programme to be used in the optimal scheme, which is within the range of estimates for existing programmes (see e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Dolton and O'Neill, 2002; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Blundell et al., 2004; OECD, 2005) . In contrast, the wage effect of training must exceed 1.7% (11%) for a two-week (three-month) programme for training to be optimally used at all. Given that estimates of the total wage effect of training are usually below 10% even for much longer programmes (Heckman et al., 1999; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002) , it is unlikely that training will be part of the optimal scheme. Interestingly, existing ALMPs already share some but not all features of the optimal scheme.
In line with existing ALMPs, it is optimal to use job search assistance usually at the beginning of unemployment and for short durations. However, if the effect of the programme deteriorates quickly over time, it is optimal to reassign jobseekers to job search assistance later in the unemployment spell.
Similar to existing ALMPS, the optimal duration of training is usually longer than that of job search assistance. Moreover, because training delays human capital depreciation, it is optimal to postpone the use of social assistance in favour of unemployment insurance payments. This justifies policies where participation prolongs benefit claims as implemented in several European countries. Yet, under the optimal policy, benefits should change depending on success or failure of training, which is usually not the case for existing policies. Furthermore, training usually should only be used for intermediate values of human capital.
Although the extended framework provides rich answers to several important questions, there are some limitations that are the subject of ongoing research. The first one is that monitoring is assumed to be perfect, allowing the insurer to verify search effort, which is unlikely to hold in reality. Imperfect monitoring could be implemented in the current framework as a technology that raises search effectiveness (or intensity) with certainty while high effort (e.g. time input) is ensured via the incentive compatibility constraint. Different degrees of monitoring would then result in different effects on search effectiveness. The difference to job search assistance would be that there is no uncertainty about the effect of the policy and that jobseekers can directly exit to employment. The optimal use of different forms of perfect and imperfect monitoring is studied in Wunsch (2007a) .
Another issue is the fact that in reality, it will be difficult to perfectly observe or verify search effectiveness. On the one hand, this is likely to have direct implications for the optimal use of the different policy instruments. On the other hand, this might make it optimal for the insurer to use some alternative form of monitoring as a technology to reduce the uncertainty about the worker's search effectiveness. These questions are addressed in Wunsch (2007c) . follows immediately from next period's envelope condition
where c f is consumption if job search failed during UI, and the strict concavity of u.
Correspondingly, the relevant first-order conditions for programme i ∈ {JA, T R} yield
where µ i ≥ 0 is the multiplier on the respective incentive compatibility constraint and (
The desired result then follows immediately from next period's envelope condition
and the strict concavity of u. Q.E.D. 
Thus, after use of JM all state variables have the same values as one period before. Consequently, implementing JM every period is always optimal, and if V is strictly concave this optimal policy is unique.
(ii) From Propositions 2 (i) and 3 (i) we know that under the conditions stated in Proposition 2 (ii), whenever JM or SA have been optimal at (U, p) they are absorbing. Thus, JA will never be used thereafter. Now consider the case where UI is optimal at (U, p). If p remains constant during UI, it is sufficient to consider the dynamics with respect to U . Lemma A1 shows that the IC constraint is binding during UI in this case. Lemma A2 then establishes that whenever UI is optimal at (U, p), V JA is more negatively sloped than V U I if θ JA ≤ π(p) and, hence, JA will never be optimal in the next period.
Lemma A1: At any (U, p) where UI is optimal and either p =p or δ p = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint binds with µ U I > 0 and we have U > U f .
Proof of Lemma A1: Concavity of V together with (18) and (19) imply that U ≥ U f . If the IC binds, this implies immediately that U > U f . Now assume that µ U I = 0. The special form of W in the absence of human capital dynamics and (20) then imply that U ≥ (1 − β)U s + βU f . However, if U f ≥ U , then U s > U from (11) and e > 0 and, hence, the IC constraint could never be satisfied. Thus, we must have U > U f whenever UI is optimal. Now note that the PK constraints of all potential future states are linear in U and that the corresponding payments can be written as c = u −1 u(c) . The PK constraints for all potential future states can be used to replace u(c). Since p remains unchanged during UI if either p =p or δ p = 0, u(c) and, hence, c are completely driven by the dynamics of U . It is then easy to show that u −1 u(c) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in U for all potential future states (because u is strictly concave). Thus, because U > U f whenever UI is optimal, we have c U I > c f and µ U I > 0 follows immediately from the strict concavity of u. Q.E.D.
Lemma A2: For every (U, p) at which UI is optimal and θ JA ≤ π(p) we have that
Proof of Lemma A2: From the first-order and envelope conditions for UI and JA we have, respectively, within 3 months after entering unemployment. Concretely, search effectiveness of individual j is estimated asp
where Y = 1 if the worker succeeded in finding employment within 3 months after entering unemployment, and where Z is a vector of variables that are related to search effectiveness, while X contains all other variables that affect the job finding probability. Concretely, a probit model is estimated with X mainly including variables that are related to reservation wages: gender, duration and amount of remaining benefit claim, educational attainment, qualification, occupational status, age, marital status, past earnings, variables summarising past employment histories that are not contained in Z. The vector Z includes measurements of labour market attachment (number and total duration of times out of labour force, time since last employment), duration of past unemployment spells (mean duration, duration of last spell), compliance with benefit conditions (imposition of sanctions, attendance of interviews at PES, cooperation with PES staff), number of placement propositions by the PES in the past, labour market conditions (local labour market conditions, seasonality dummies, industry and occupation dummies), health, foreigner status (control for potential language problems), presence of (young) children, lone parent status, participation in JA in the past, realised wage increases and decreases in the past (control for ability to find better jobs). Because of the high dimensionality of the X, the averaging over the realisations of Z is performed conditional on the index x β rather than directly on the values of x.
C Estimation of the hazard rates and the wage depreciation and accumulation rates
Nonparametric estimates of the baseline exit rates to employment without participation in JA or TR as well as the wage depreciation and accumulation rates can be obtained from nonparticipants who are matched to the reference population of interest using the radius matching estimator proposed and applied by . The matching is performed because interest is in the values of these parameters for the reference population, which also includes participants and therefore, differs systematically from actual nonparticipants in characteristics that also affect the exit rate to employment and wages. Moreover, to estimate the wage depreciation and accumulation rates, selective subgroups of nonparticipants are used. apply a matching procedure, that is based on the propensity score, 33 and has the following advantages. To allow for higher precision when many 'good' comparison observations are available, they incorporate the idea of calliper or radius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algorithm used for example by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) . Second, matching quality is increased by exploiting the fact that appropriate weighted regressions, that use the sampling weights from matching, have the so-called double robustness property. This property implies that the estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is based on a correctly specified selection model, or the regression model is correctly specified (e.g. Rubin, 1979; Joffe et al., 2004) . Moreover, this procedure may reduce small sample bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and thus, increase robustness of the estimator. For more information on this estimator see .
The exit rates to employment are approximated by the probability to find employment within 2 months after entering unemployment. Before that, exit rates are extremely small due to labour market frictions. In order not to pick up these frictions, the 2-month probability is chosen rather than the immediate exit rate. The exit rates are estimated in 100 subgroups defined by 20 equidistant quantiles of the human capital distribution and 5 equidistant quantiles of the distribution of search effectiveness. The number of nonparticipants available in the subgroups varies between 155 and 1670 observations with the vast majority of cells having more than 700 observations. The results are displayed in the left panel of Figure 7 . For the simulation a smooth function, which is fitted to these estimates, is used (see the right panel of Figure 7 ). Note: Left panel: probability to exit to employment within 2 months after entering unemployment. Right panel: fitted hazard functions using logarithmic functions.
The wage depreciation rate is calculated from the weighted mean wage of nonparticipants who find employment within 3 month after entering unemployment and the weighted mean wage of nonparticipants who find employment only within 12-14 months. In turn, the wage accumulation rate is calculated from the weighted mean wage nonparticipants, who find employment, receive early (months 1-3) and later (months 12-14) in the employment spell.
D Identification and estimation of the effects of JA and TR of different durations
Here, the population for which the effects are to be estimated is an entry sample into unemployment that is defined independent of any programme participation later in the unemployment spell. Miquel (2001, 2005) show that in this case, the effects of interest are identified under the so-called weak dynamic conditional independence assumption (W-DCIA). This assumption states, first, that conditional on confounding variables at t = 0, potential outcomes measured from time τ ≥ 1 onwards are independent of programme participation in period t = 1. This would account for any selectivity between programme participants and the population of interest. Second, conditional on participation status up to time t and confounding variables of all periods up to time t, potential outcomes are independent of participation in period t + 1. This would account for endogeneity of programme durations. The third part of the W-DCIA is a common-support requirement which demands overlap in the control variables between the populations involved in each of the selection steps.
To judge whether W-DCIA is plausible in this particular application, first, the confounding variables for programme participation relative to the reference population of interest have to be identified. This comparison is mainly driven by the difference between participants and nonparticipants in a particular programme. Second, those variables have to be detected which influence both outcomes and changes in treatment status, i.e. the decision between staying in the programme for another period and leaving.
Before discussing the determinants of selectivity, the outcome variables of interest have to be defined in order to identify the subset of confounding variables among these determinants. The choice of the outcome variables of interest is driven by the definition of search effectiveness and human capital in the calibration. For job search assistance the probability of finding employment within three months after completing a spell of JA is chosen. For training the impact on human capital is estimated by the effect of TR on average wages during employment. Besides the initial levels of search effectiveness and human capital, for both outcome variables the main driving factors are presumably gender, age, educational attainment, health, presence of (young) children, profession, industry, desired form of employment and local labour market conditions. All these factors are captured by the data. Moreover, information on past employment histories and compliance with benefit conditions indirectly captures unobserved factors like ability and motivation.
Selection into programmes from the reference population is driven by programme eligibility, selection by caseworkers and self-selection by the unemployed. By construction of the sample, all unemployed are eligible because they receive unemployment insurance payments. Caseworkers select on the basis of an assessment of the employment prospects and the specific qualification needs of the unemployed. According to German legislation they, furthermore, have to take into account the chances of the unemployed for completing a specific programme successfully, and the situation in the local labour market. Thus, caseworker decisions are basically driven by the same factors as the outcome variables themselves. Similar arguments apply to self-selection by the unemployed because they also compare their employment prospects with and without a programme as well as the corresponding costs in terms of effort or potentially foregone benefits in case of refusal to participate. For training an additional and rather strong incentive to participate is the prolongation of total benefit claims. Since remaining benefit claims are observed in the data, this can be captured.
Decisions to leave or stay in the programme are driven by factors that change after entering a programme. The most important factors are probably the arrival of job offers, exhaustion of benefit claims and significant changes in health conditions. Other factors may be noncompliance with benefit conditions, changes in family status, moving to another place, or take up or loss of a minor employment, 34 and all of these as well as exhaustion of benefits are directly observed in the data. Changes in health conditions are observed if they are severe enough to affect unemployment insurance status. Arrival of job offers is not directly observed in the data, but the number of placement propositions by the PES per spell. 35 To approximate the arrival of job offers at or up to a specific point in time a Heckman (1979) -type selection model for the log number of placement propositions per day which accounts for zero propositions in the spell is estimated in the subsample of nonparticipants using a rich set of time-invariant (or deterministically changing) and time-varying variables measured before programme start as explanatory variables. The number of placement propositions at different points in time is then predicted for all individuals in the sample using the updated measurement of the time-varying covariates.
In summary, most of the potentially confounding factors are directly observed in the data. Moreover, those that are not directly observed either can be controlled for indirectly by information on past employment histories and compliance with benefit conditions, like e.g. ability or motivation, or can be approximated by use of observed variables, like arrival of job offers. Thus, the data are sufficiently rich to capture the main sources of selection bias at the different points in time before and during programme participation. Lechner (2006b,a) proposes a sequential nearest-neighbour matching estimator where the matching is based on propensity scores to estimate the effects of different sequences of programmes for a population defined within one of the sequences. Consider the case where interest is in estimating the effect of sequence S 0 = (S 0 1 , S 0 2 ) compared to S 1 = (S 1 1 , S 1 2 ) for the population defined by S 0 1 . In the first step, the population defined by S 1 1 is matched to the population of interest S 0 1 based on the estimated propensity score of the corresponding selection equation. Second, the population defined by S 1 2 is matched to those observations in S 1 1 that served as matches in the previous step based on the propensity scores from this and the first selection step. In a similar vein, the population defined by S 0 2 is matched to the one defined by S 0 1 based on the corresponding propensity score. To obtain an estimate of the effect of interest, the reweighed outcome of the population defined by S 0 2 is then subtracted from the reweighed outcome of the population defined by S 1 2 . Here, a modified version of this estimator is used. First, the effects are estimated for a population defined outside the sequences under consideration. This implies that an additional matching step has to be performed in each comparison. The populations defined by the first element of each sequence under consideration have to be matched to the population of interest for which the effects are to be estimated before matching within each of the sequences is performed. Second, radius matching as proposed by for static evaluation problems rather than nearest-neighbour matching is used to increase efficiency and potentially robustness given that the reference population of interest is potentially large compared to the populations defined by the last element of the sequences under consideration. 36 Tables 3 and 4 display the estimated effects of JA and TR of different durations on, respectively, search effectiveness and human capital. For each programme, the effects are estimated separately for two subsamples of the reference population defined by persons with a value below/above the median of the respective variable of interest. The number of observation available for the estimation in each subgroup and programme type varies between 400 and 1200 observations (see Table 5 ). For each comparison, less than 1% of the reference population are deleted due a lack of common support.
34 To provide additional work incentives benefit recipients can earn additional labour income without losing their claim if they work less than 15 hours per week. 35 A placement proposition is a job vacancy proposed to the jobseeker by the caseworker. 36 If the comparison population is small compared to the population for which the effects are estimated, using more than one similar observation prevents that one particular observation gets too much weight. 0.0081 0.0496 Note: Difference in the probability to exit to employment within 3 months (%-points). NP: nonparticipation, JAn: completion of n half-months of JA. None of the effects is significant on the 1, 5 or 10% significance level. b the fraction of persons not employed (with zero average wage; %-points). NP: nonparticipation, TR1: completed up to 6 months of TR, TR2: completed more than 6 months of TR. None of the effects is significant on the 1, 5 or 10% significance level. 
